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Abstract: Hahn and Wallsten [3] wrote that net neutrality usually means
that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for Internet access,
do not favor one content provider over another, and do not charge content
providers for sending information over broadband lines to end users." In this
paper we study the implications of being non-neutral, particularly by charging
the content providers. Using game theoretic tools, we show that by adding the
option for the service providers to charge the content providers, not only may
the content providers and the internauts suﬀer, but also the access provider's
performance degrades.
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Étude des réseaux non-neutres
Résumé : Dans cet article, nous examinons les conséquences de règles de
facturation violant la troisième clause de la déﬁnition de neutralité du réseau
selon Hahn et Wallsten [3]: les fournisseurs de connectivité haut débit ne
facturent qu'une seule fois les utilisateurs pour l'accès à l'Internet, ne favorisent
pas un fournisseur de contenu par rapport à un autre, et ne facturent pas les
fournisseurs de contenu pour envoyer de l'information aux utilisateurs via les
réseaux à large bande. Nous montrons, à l'aide d'outils de la théorie des jeux,
que la possibilité de procéder à une telle facturation peut nuire, non seulement
aux fournisseurs de contenu et aux utilisateurs, mais aussi aux fournisseurs de
connectivité eux-même.
Mots-clés : Neutralité du réseaux, modèles mathématiques.
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1 Introduction
Network neutrality is an approach to providing network access without unfair
discrimination among applications, content, nor the speciﬁc source of traﬃc.
What is discrimination and what is fair discrimination? If there are two appli-
cations or two services or two providers that require the same network resources
and one is oﬀered better quality of service (shorter delays, higher transmission
capacity, etc.) then there is a discrimination. When is a discrimination fair"1?
A preferential treatment of traﬃc is considered fair as long as the preference
is left for the user2. Internet service providers (ISPs) may have interest in dis-
crimination either for technological problems or for economic reasons. Traﬃc
congestion has been a central argument for the need to discriminate traﬃc (for
technological reasons) and moreover, for not practicing network neutrality, in
particular to deal with high-volume peer-to-peer traﬃc. However, many ISPs
have been blocked or throttled p2p traﬃc independently of congestion condi-
tions.
There may be many hypothetical ways to violate the principle of network
neutrality. Hahn and Wallsten wrote that network neutrality usually means
that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for Internet access,
do not favor one content provider over another, and do not charge content
providers for sending information over broadband lines to end users." (p. 1 of
[3]) We therefore restrict our attention in this paper to the practices of these
types of network neutrality.
That net neutrality acts as a disincentive for capacity expansion of their
networks, is an argument recently raised by ISPs. In [1] the validity of this
claim was checked. Their main conclusion is that under net neutrality the ISPs
invest to reach the social optimal level, while under-or-over investing is the
result when net neutrality is dropped. In this case, ISPs stand as winners, while
content providers (CP) move to a worst position. Users that rely on services
that have paid the ISPs for preferential treatment will be better oﬀ, while the
rest of the users will have a signiﬁcantly worse service.
ISPs often justify charging content providers by their need to cover large and
expensive amount of network resources. This is in particular relevant in the 3G
1The recent decision on Comcast v. the FCC was expected by the general public to
deal with the subject of fair traﬃc discrimination, as the FCC ordered Comcast to stop
interfering with subscribers traﬃc generated by peer-to-peer networking applications. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was asked to review this order by
Comcast, arguing not only on the necessity of managing scarce network resources, but also
on the non-existent jurisdiction of the FCC over network management practices. The Court
decided that the FCC did not have express statutory authority over the subject, neither
demonstrated that its action was "reasonably ancillary to the ... eﬀective performance of
its statutorily mandated responsibilities". The FCC was deemed, then, unable to sanction
discrimatory practices on Internet's traﬃc carried out by american ISPs, and the underlying
case on the fairness of their discriminatory practices was not even discussed.
2Nonetheless, users are just one of many actors in the net neutrality debate, which has
been enliven throughout the world by several public consultations on new legislation on the
subject. The ﬁrst one, proposed in the USA (expired on 26/04/2010), was looking for the
best means of preserving a free and open Internet. The second one, carried out in France
(ﬁnishing 17/05/2010), asks for the diﬀerent points of view over net neutrality. A third one is
intended to be presented by the UE in the summer of 2010, looking for a balance on the parties
concerned as users are entitled to an access the services they want, while ISPs and CPs should
have the right incentives and opportunities to keep investing, competing and innovating. See
[9, 2, 8].
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wireless networks where huge investments were required for getting licenses for
the use of radio frequencies. On the other hand, the content oﬀered by a CP
may be the most important source of the demand for Internet access; thus, the
beneﬁts of the access providers are due in part to the content of the CPs. It
thus seems "fair" that beneﬁts that ISP make of that demand would be shard
by the CPs.
We ﬁnd this notion of fair sharing of reveneus between economic actors in
the heart of cooperative game theory. In particular, the Shapley value approach
for splitting reveneus is based on several axioms and the latter fairness is on of
them. Many references have advocated the use of the Shapley value approach for
sharing the proﬁts between the providers, see, e.g., [5, 6]. We note however that
the same reasoning used to support payments by access providers to content
providers (in the context of can be used in the opposite direction. Indeed,
many CPs receive third party income such as advertising revenue thanks to
the user demand (eyeballs) that they create. Therefore, using a Shapley value
approach would require content providers to help pay for the network access
that is necessary to create this new income.
The goal of this paper is to study the impact of such side payments between
providers on the utilities of all actors. More precisely, we study implications
of one provider being at a dominating position so as to impose payments from
the other one3. We examine these questions in this paper using simple game
theoretic tools. We show how side payments may be harmful for all parties
involved (users and providers).
Another way to favor a provider over another one is to enforce a leader-
follower relation to determine pricing actions. We show how this too can be
harmful for all.
2 Basic model: three collective actors and usage-
based pricing
We consider the following simple model of three actors,
 the internauts (users) collectively,
 a network access provider for the internauts, collectively called ISP1, and
 a content provider and its ISP, collectively called CP2.
In this section, the two providers are assumed peers; leader-follower dynamics
are considered in Section 4 below. The internauts pay for service/content that
requires both providers. Assume that they pay pi ≥ 0 to provider i (CP2 being
i = 2 and ISP1 being i = 1) and that their demand is given by
D = D0 − pd
where
p = p1 + p2 ≥ 0, D ≥ 0.
3In the European Union, such dominating positions in the telecommunications markets
are controlled by the article 14, paragraph 3 of the Directive 2009/140/EC, considering the
application of remedies to prevent the leverage of a large market power over a secondary
market closely related.
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So, provider i's revenues are
Ui = Dpi, i = 1, 2.
2.1 Collaboration
The total price that the providers can obtain if they cooperate is maximized at
pi = D0/(4d). The total revenue per provider is then Umaxi = D
2
0/(8d). The
demand is then D0/2.
2.2 Fair competition
If the providers do not cooperate then the utility of provider i is obtained by
computing the Nash equilibrium. We get:
∂Ui
∂pi
= D − pid = 0, i = 1, 2. (1)
This gives p1 = p2 = D0/(3d). The demand is now D0/3, larger than in the
cooperative case, and the revenue of each provider is D20/9, less than before.
Next consider the competitive model and assume we install side payments:
CP2 is requested to pay p3 to ISP1 for transit" costs. So, the revenues of the
providers are:
U1 = [D0 − (p1 + p2) · d] (p1 + p3)
U2 = [D0 − (p1 + p2) · d] (p2 − p3)
As the model so far is symmetric, we can in fact allow for negative value of p3
which would model payment from the ISP1 to CP2 instead, e.g., payment for
copyright, as discussed below.
2.3 Discussion of side payments
At this point we render it asymmetric by assuming that p3 is determined by ISP1
for the case p3 > 0, i.e. additional transit revenue from the content provider
in a two sided" payment model to ISP1 [4, 7]. Then, unless D = 0 there is
no optimal p3: as it increases, so does U1. Thus, at equilibrium necessarily
D = 0, and the revenues of both service and content providers are 0. Hence
p1 and p2 sum up to D0/d. Then by decreasing p1 slightly, the demand will
become strictly positive, so ISP1 can increase its utility by U1 without bound by
choosing p3 suﬃciently large. Therefore, at equilibrium p1 = 0 and p2 = D0/d.
If p2 > p3 then by a slight decrease in p2, U2 strictly increases so this is not
equilibrium. We conclude that at equilibrium, p3 ≥ p2. To summarize, the set
of equilibria is given by {p1 = 0, p2 = D0/d and p3 ≥ D0/d}.
Thus by discriminating one provider over the other and letting it charge
the other provider, both providers lose. Obviously the internauts do not gain
anything either, as their demand is zero!
We have considered above side payment from the CP2 to ISP1. In practice,
the side payment may go in the other direction. Indeed, there is a growing
literature that argues that ISP1 has to pay to CP2. This conclusion is based on
cooperative game theory (and in particular on Shapley values) which stipulates
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that if the presence of an economic actor A in a coalition creates revenue to
another actor B, then actor A ought to be paid proportionally to the beneﬁts
that its presence in the coalition created. In our case, the CP2 creates a demand
of users who need Internet access, and without the CP2, ISP1 would have less
subscribers.
The use of Shapley value (and of a coalition game approach, rather than of a
non-cooperative approach) has the advantage of achieving Pareto optimality. In
particular this means that the total revenue for ISP1 and CP2 would be those
computed under the cooperative approach.
Side payment to the CP2 from ISP1 may also represent payment to the copy-
right holders of the content being downloaded by the internauts. In particular,
a new law is proposed in France, by a member of parliament of the governing
party, to allow download of unauthorized copyright content and in return be
charged proportionally to the volume of the download, with an average payment
of about ﬁve euros per month. A similar law had been already proposed and
rejected ﬁve years ago by the opposition in France. It suggested to apply a tax
of about ﬁve euros on those who wish to be authorized to download copyrighted
content. In contrast, the previously proposed laws received the support of the
trade union of musicians in France. If these laws were accepted, the service
providers would have been requested to collect the tax (that would be paid
by the internauts as part of their subscription contract). Note that although
p3 < 0 in our model could represent these types of side payments, the copyright
payments per user are actually not decision variables.
3 Revenue generated by advertising
We now go back to the basic collaborative model to consider the case where
the CP2 has an additional source of revenue from advertisement that amounts
to p4D. p4 is assumed in this paper to be a constant. The total income of the
providers is
Π = (D0 − pd)(p+ p4) (2)
Then
∂Π
∂p
= D0 − 2pd− dp4 (3)
Equating to zero, we obtain
p =
D0 − p4d
2d
(4)
The total demand is (D0 + p4d)/2, and the total revenues at equilibrium are
Umaxt =
D20 + 2 d p4D0 + d
2 p24
4 d
(5)
This result does not depend on the way the revenue from the internauts is
split between the providers.
3.1 The case where p2 = 0
In particular, the previous result covers the case where p2 = 0, i.e., the case
where advertising is the only source of revenue for the content provider CP2.
INRIA
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One may consider this to be the business model of the collective consisting of
(i) BitTorrent permanent seeders and (ii) specialized torrent ﬁle resolvers (e.g.,
Pirate Bay).
Note that BitTorrent permanent seeders may be indiﬀerent to downloading
to BitTorrent leecher clients (particularly during periods of time when the seeder
workstations are not otherwise being used) because of ﬂat-rate pricing for net-
work access, i.e., a ﬂat-rate based on capacity without associated usage-based
costs (not even as overages).
3.2 Best response
The utilities for the network access provider ISP1 and the content provider CP2
are, respectively,
U1 = [D0 − (p1 + p2) · d] (p1 + p3) (6)
and
U2 = [D0 − (p1 + p2) · d] (p2 − p3 + p4). (7)
We ﬁrst show that for any p2, it is optimal for the ISP1 to choose p1 = 0.
First consider the problem of the best choice of p1 and p3 assuming the quantity
p1 + p3 is constant; clearly, U1 strictly decreases in p1 so that a best response
cannot have p1 > 0.
Thus, if p2 is not controlled (in particular if p2 = 0 so that CP2's only revenue
is from a third party and not directly from the users), then ISP1 would gain
more by charging the CP2 than by charging the users. This is also consistent
with the simple fact that ∂U1/∂p3 ≥ ∂U1/∂p1.
3.3 Nash equilibrium
With p1 = 0 and p3 ≥ 0, the utility of ISP1 is
U1 = [D0 − p2d] p3 (8)
Thus the condition on the best response of ISP1 for a given p2 gives p2 = D0/d,
i.e., the demand is zero. On the other hand, for this p2 to be a best response
for U2, p3 = p2 +p4. We conclude that there is a unique Nash equilibrium given
by p1 = 0, p2 = D0/d, and p3 = D0/d+ p4.
4 Stackelberg equilibrium
Stackelberg equilibrium corresponds to another aspect of asymmetric competi-
tion, in which one competitor is a leader and the other a follower. Actions are
no longer taken independently: here, ﬁrst the leader takes an action, and then
the follower reacts to this action.
Let's restrict to p3 ≥ 0.
We assume that the ISP1 is the leader. Given p1 and p3, U2 is concave in
p2. So, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for p2 to maximize this is
∂U2
∂p2
= D0 − d · (p2 − p3 + p4)− d · (p1 + p2) = 0 (9)
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holds with equality for p2 > 0. That is, to maximize U2,
p2 =
1
2
(D0
d
+ p3 − p1 − p4
)
> 0. (10)
Substituting p2 in U1, we obtain:
U1 = [D0 − (p1 + p2) · d] (p1 + p3)
=
1
2
[D0 − 3p1d− p3d+ p4d] (p1 + p3)
We now compute the actions that maximize the utility U1 which is concave in
(p1, p3). We have
∂U1
∂p1
=
D0 − 4dp3 − 6dp1 + dp4
2
≤ 0 (11)
∂U1
∂p3
=
D0 − 2dp3 − 4dp1 + dp4
2
≤ 0 (12)
For p1 > 0, (11) should hold as equality. Subtracting (11) from (12) we get
p3 ≤ −p1, and hence they are zero. This conclusion is in contradiction with our
assumption p1 > 0.
Assume that p1 = 0 and p3 > 0. Then U1 is concave in p3 and (12) holds
with equality. Hence
p3 =
D0
2d
+
p4
2
(13)
maximizes U1. Substituting in (10) we get
p2 =
1
4
(3D0
d
− p4
)
(14)
We conclude that if p4d < 3D0 Then the Nash equilibrium is p1 = 0, and p3
and p2 are given, respectively, by (13) and (14).
Since we assume here that p2 ≥ 0, then in case p4d ≥ 3D0, we will have
p2 = 0 since this value maximizes (14).
5 Conclusions and on-going work
Using a simple, parsimonious model of linearly diminishing user/consumer de-
mand as a function of price, we studied a game between collective players, the
user ISP and content provider, under a variety of scenarios including: non-
neutral two-sided transit pricing, copyright payments made by the ISP, the
eﬀects of ﬂat-rate pricing, advertising revenue, cooperation, and leadership. In
particular, we demonstrated under what conditions non-neutral transit pricing
of content providers may result in revenue loss for all parties in play (i.e., so
that at least one player opts out of the game, where all players are necessary
for positive outcome).
In on-going work, we are considering issues of non-monetary value and copy-
right. Moreover, we are including the users as active players. Finally, we are
considering the eﬀects of content-speciﬁc (not application neutral) pricing.
INRIA
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